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Writing has nothing to do with signifying. It has to do with surveying, mapping, even realms that are yet to come.

A Thousand Plateaus (4-5)

I.

We are suspended between two ages of writing.

Of Grammatology (87)

The purpose of this exam in critical theory is to outline grammatology, the science of writing, as a field of knowledge. My initial frame for this exploration traces general questions of writing through constellations of memory, cognition, technology, and the institutionalization of knowledge. More specifically, I hope to sketch the possibilities for writing in an age of what Walter Ong calls "secondary orality" or the electronic paradigm, responding to the current cultural shift from literacy to electronics as a technology for thinking. Although the move towards electronics has provoked crises in Humanities Departments heavily invested in literate modes of writing and cognition, this shift isn't unique or new, as Eric Havelock points out in Preface to Plato. In Plato's day, as in ours', the educational apparatus lagged behind technological advances (40). In addition, the boundaries between artist, actor, and pupil became confused as poetic, educational, and recreational situations became indistinguishable (24). These are precisely the issues I would eventually like to address in order to speculate on the contemporary possibilities for thinking through writing, hinging avant garde art, electronic technology, and institutionalized learning. Thus the first section of this exam begins with Ong, Havelock, and Jack Goody, theorists who consistently take up the question of how writing, as a technology of memory, does not simply influence, but actually makes possible cognitive and social processes. Their work, demonstrating the need to rethink writing away from an ethnocentric dependence on speech, sets up the second part of this exam, where Jacques Derrida takes up their quest with a radical redefinition of writing. The third section begins to address the question of grammatological practices in relation to method, focusing on alternative possibilities in the work of theorists such as Benjamin, White, and Clifford, among others. Part three ends with a specific concatenation of ethnography, feminism, and grammatology in Trihn T. Mihn-Ha's texts, which suggest a feminist way of working based on performative writing through embodiment. Since Trihn asserts that "writing is becoming," the last section of this exam briefly outlines the possibilities for grammatology in A Thousand Plateaus, another attempt to theorize the displacement of ethno and logocentrism through the image of the "rhizome" and the concept of "becoming-other."

The crisis in Greek culture, as Ong and Havelock point out, was linked to a change the educational system which rejected poetry in favor of philosophy as its new foundation. This shift, both writers argue, was due to a cognitive restructuring made possible through the technology of writing. Criticizing Saussure for assuming that writing simply represents spoken language through inscription, Ong cites the work of Milman Parry to demonstrate that oral and literate compositional strategies are profoundly different, and that the key to these differences is memory: the storage and retrieval of information. Writing produces the ability to store knowledge outside the body, engendering the critical distance necessary for analysis and abstraction, while oral cultures remember using formulaic means tied to the body: set patterns that are aggregative, communal, situational, and dependent on rhythm, identification, and repetition. These differences were at the root of Plato's objections to the poetic tradition in education. He was suspicious of poetry's use of sensual identification and repetitive memorization, and argued for a philosophical method of teaching which stressed self reflection and critical distance; attributes possible, as Ong and Havelock point out, only through the internalized mnemonic capabilities of writing. Plato's dialectics, however, rejected writing as "artificial memory." In fact, Ong notes that many of today's objections to the use of computers were used by Plato as arguments against writing, a scene that Derrida later elaborates on in "Plato's Pharmacy" (79). Ong states that for Plato writing is inhuman, pretending to establish outside the mind what can only be known inside. Writing, therefore, is a manufactured process, a thing that actually destroys memory, is basically unresponsive, and cannot defend itself as the spoken word can (80). Arguing the weakness of Plato's position, Ong points out that not only did Plato resort to writing to make his objections effective, but that the technology of writing actually brought philosophical analysis and critique into existence. Like us, Plato becomes a transitional figure caught between two paradigms. But Plato's denial of writing, its denigrated position as secondary to speech, has become the accepted tradition in our educational systems. But before I take up the question of logocentrism and the possibilities for cultural graphology in Derrida's Of Grammatology, I'd like to discuss further the attributes of orality and literacy, with an eye towards Ong's suggestion of a "secondary orality": the electronic paradigm.

Havelock reiterates our cultural predisposition to believe that speech is fundamental while preserved communication is derivative. But research into Homeric poetry shows him that this relationship can be reversed, that the idiom and content of the preserved word sets the formal limits within which the spoken word can be expressed. The consequences of this reversal are not limited to verbal idiom, and as Havelock argues, extend to the human state of mind as well (134-5). As he points out, the shift from the oral epic journey to the written abstract catalogue was reflected linguistically in a new syntax for pronouns based on a subject/object split (198). And as Ong notes, the repeatability of print lends itself to the scanning of exact visual statements which, when combined with "objectivity," engenders modern science. Print also makes possible the large scale quantification of knowledge (math), portable books which foster a sense of personal privacy, a new sense of the ownership of words (copyright), and a larger sense of personal property. In other words Havelock, like Ong and Goody, argues that as the arrangement of experience in the acoustic, poetic style of communication is rearranged in

a visual, prosaic form, experience itself changes (142, 158). As the new technology for memory, writing and the form of the book set the limits of cognition, and even consciousness, for literate cultures (135).

In *The Domestication of the Savage Mind*, Jack Goody elaborates on the values, benefits and pitfalls of literacy for cognitive processes and social institutions. His work emerges from a critique of Levi-Strauss's dichotomous classification of mind and thought into the categories "savage" and "domesticated." For Goody, Levi-Strauss is a victim of the ethnocentric binarisms enshrined in literate systems of categorization (8). Like Ong and Havelock, Goody believes that differences in intellectual processes relate not so much to differences in "mind," but to differences in systems of storing, analyzing, and producing knowledge. Not only do these methods contribute to the growth of cultural knowledge, but they transform it as well. Thus the difficulties facing literate anthropologists' researches into oral cultures are very similar to contemporary literary critics' attempts to interpret Homeric poetry..

Following along the lines of Ong and Havelock's arguments, Goody attributes critical activity, rationality, skepticism, and logic to the technology of writing and alphabetic literacy (37). But more specifically, he shows how writing's organization of knowledge into tabular form results in the compartmentalization of information, encouraging analysis through the freezing of contextual statements into dichotomised classifications. This schematic treatment of categories of knowledge is exemplified by Ramus' attempts to replace earlier technologies of memory with new ones based on a dialectical and hierarchical order moving from general to specific (71). Although these oppositions may "simplify" knowledge, Goody points out that they often do so at the expense of understanding the frame of reference. Once again criticizing ethnocentric and value-laden literate models of classification, Goody writes: "And to shift frames of reference and to regard such tables as models of the camshaft behind the jigsaw is to mistake metaphor for mechanism" (73). Yet Goody also reminds us that the formalization of writing, although distorting, is also generative (112).

The storage and decontextualizing capabilities of writing embodied in the list (inventories, shopping lists, encyclopedias) make possible the re-ordering of categories and concepts, representing a significant change in modes of thought (81). This shift in cognitive potentiality is perhaps best demonstrated in Goody's examination of the formula and its relation to memory and creativity in both oral and literate domains. Although oral composition used set phrases, content was contextually oriented and consequently flexible, and therefore not available for transmission through verbatim memory. Instead, the emphasis on repetition and exact copying was a result of early writing systems, which prompted the separation of composer and performer, mind and body. Later writing, with its greater consciousness of form and precise replication of memory is, according to Goody, conserving but not conservative, contributing to the rapid growth of knowledge through abstraction (127-8). This literate notion of formula gives rise to recipes, prescriptions, and the development of medicine.

Of particular interest is Goody's statement that recipes, which encourage the isolation of elements, experiment, testing, and assessment, function as reference books "whose very existence *changes the course and nature of teaching*" (136, my italics). Within the culinary arts Goody makes a distinction, predicated on the different strategies of orality and literacy, between "country cuisine" where methods are learned in the

context of family living, and the isolated experience of reading, testing, and fulfilling the experimental method of a cookbook. For Goody, "country cuisine's" indirect means of participation based on watching and tradition is necessarily conservative, tied to available ingredients and based on the improvisation of certain base recipes. They typify what he believes are the constraints and freedoms of the *bricoleur*, as opposed to those of the *scientist*, where exact measurement leads to discovery and invention (140). The written form of the recipe, connected etymologically to the word "receipt," enables recipes to exist independently of the instructor, and they acquire a more general quality. Insofar as they are lists, recipes as prescriptions led to an arranging and rearranging of data, concepts, classes, rules, and procedures. As prescriptions for action, they formulated programs which extended the repertoires of both specialists and laymen while encouraging experimentation and comparisons of results (138). For Goody, the written form of culinary recipes hasn't the relevance for the growth of knowledge that medical prescriptions have, but do have important implications in the context of changing social relations, blurring class distinctions and publicizing the secrets of subcultures (142). [See Goody: [The Sociology of Cooking](#)]. Although initially medical recipes were related to magical conjuring, Goody aligns the Greek split in the arts between rhapsodes and composers with the later distinction between physicians, who act formally through books, and magicians, who act through feeling (144). This separation between science and religion, or mind and emotion, is precisely the split that Plato was trying to achieve in reformulating Greek educational systems, and returns me to a more elaborate discussion of the possibilities for writing in Ong's age of "secondary orality."

Toward the beginning of his book Goody states that writing is "the most popular divinatory technique," since it makes possible access to secrets, complex ideas, and new methods (30); he ends his book by asking: Why should magic disappear from science? Along similar lines, Ong reminds us that "glamour girls are really grammar girls," citing the old etymological connection between glamour, as spell casting power, and grammar, as book learning (93). If, as Ong, Havelock, and Goody argue, the technology for storing, retrieving, and transmitting information sets the cognitive limits of a culture, then several questions must be explored in relation to our current cultural transition from literacy to electronic technologies of memory. For example, how do we remember in an age of electronics? What happens to writing? Is the connection between writing and memory limited to inscription? If writing restructures consciousness, what happens to cognition in an electronic paradigm?

Ong suggests that the age of electronics will be an era of "secondary orality," a return to oral mnemonic strategies such as communal participation, situational and associative logic, concentration on the present, identification, and the use of formulas (136). This is, however, a return to orality indelibly marked by the self-consciousness of literacy, suggesting that remembering in an electronic paradigm will combine oral attributes, such as identification, with literate characteristics, such as critical distance and analysis. In addition, the connection Ong makes between mnemonics, oral narratives, and avant-garde art may offer clues for electronic writing. Oral narratives are episodic, a discourse of becoming or endless doings and events, where we find ourselves "in the middle of things" (144). The oral singer, according to Ong, does not convey information in a pipe-line transfer of data from singer to listener, but instead *remembers in a curiously public way* themes and formulas from other singers which she rhapsodizes in her own

way for a particular occasion (145-6, my italics). Oral memory does not rely on linear cause/effect sequences, but on dramatic presentation joining cultural tradition, situational needs, and a sort of unconscious knowledge through bodily motions. Likewise avant-garde art, as Ong describes it, eschews plot, yet uses the narratives of memories, with their unconscious echoes, in a self-conscious way (151). As Ong reminds us, technologies of the memory don't merely store what we know, they also *style* it, so the logic of literacy will be displaced in an age of electronics (155). In other words, there are formulaic possibilities for writing, moving away from the cause/effect rationale of literate explanation toward understanding based on repetitive pattern formation.

The era of "secondary orality," as the combinatory paradigm, may witness the return of magic to science, glamour to grammar, and divinatory powers to writing. A constellation of magic, method, memory, and writing, represented in the early role of the Muse, may be useful for beginning to rethink the mind/body split precipitated by writing and valorized by philosophy from Plato to the present, and for speculating further on the possibilities for electronic writing and cognition. In terms of poetic performance, the Muse was not divine inspiration but a symbol of the poet's professional secrets. Muse, as spell, was related to Mnemosune, memory; the poet/instructor, as cultural encyclopedist, wove a "spell of memory" using personal methods such as music to connect learning to sensual pleasure. In this situation, people learned through their entire nervous systems; proper actions, diction, etc. were associated with pleasurable memories, music, song, and dance rhythms. As Havelock points out, Plato's main objection to poetic pedagogy was that people learned through identification and imitation. Mimesis as Plato defined it, however, is not exactly what we consider imitation today. We assume that there is an original that is then copied. But Plato's problem with the oral state of mind was that there was imitation but no original. In other words, there was no separate existence of an original to be copied because poet and audience lived a shared reality; the subject and object of knowledge were conflated. This conflated reality, as non-abstract and non-philosophical, Plato labeled "doxa" or opinion, which he equated with mimesis.

Plato used painting as an example to explain that mimesis can never be anything but a phantasy, since it can never portray the whole object at once, and the portrayal is in contrast to what "is." Painting is further linked to mimesis because it casts a spell on the viewer through color, producing habits of optical distortion and contradictions to reality. Mimesis, therefore, is an enemy to calculation and antithetical to episteme, or scientific knowledge. Plato's problem with poetry, according to Havelock, was that it accepted wandering and contradiction in physical reporting, and violated principles of consistency. In other words, it allowed for contradictions without labelling them as such. The difficulties inherent in doxa and mimesis, as both content and psychological condition of poetry, is that they are "in between," not knowledge and not ignorance, the "is plus the is not" (247). Plato's rejection of poetry in favor of philosophy is based, for Havelock, on the contrast of two different syntactical systems. Poetry, as the operation of "endless doings," cannot connect a subject and a predicate with "is," the philosophical mark of a relationship permanent and unchanging. Philosophy, for Plato, was the triumph of "being" over "becoming."

In a world of Ideal Forms, writing, as representation and adjunct technology to being, can only take a back seat to the attributes closest to the Ideal, which are speech and interiorized mental abstraction. We are now back to Ong's criticism of Saussure, but the

implications seem much larger. If we are to explore poetic attributes, such as doxa and mimesis, as potential cognitive strategies for writing in an age of secondary orality, the subsequent collapse in the distinction between subject and object forces us, then, to rethink the definition of writing away from its current position as a tool for subjects inscribing objects of knowledge. For Havelock, Plato demonstrates that an alteration in mnemonics effects syntax and changes consciousness; but as Derrida argues, there is no memory and no subject without writing.

II.

One could speak of a "liberation of memory," of an exteriorization always already begun but always larger than the trace which, beginning from the elementary programs of so-called "instinctive" behavior up to the constitution of electronic card indexes and reading machines, enlarges difference and the possibility of putting in reserve: it at once and in the same movement constitutes and effaces so-called conscious subjectivity, its logos, and its theological attributes.

Of Grammatology (84)

It is the connection Plato makes between speech and "living memory" which renders writing derivative and auxiliary. Labelled as dangerous, writing, as "artificial memory," ultimately engenders a kind of forgetfulness since it wanders unanchored from the authority of the logos, voice of the father, or transcendental signified. In Of Grammatology, Derrida demonstrates how logocentrism, as the metaphysics of phonetic writing and the most powerful ethnocentrism, has controlled the concept of writing, the history of metaphysics, and the concept of science. More specifically, I am interested in his extended and radical redefinition of writing as initiating a program for writing in the age of secondary orality. As Derrida outlines, thinkers from Aristotle to the present have privileged the phoneme, as the non-exterior voice closest to the thought of the signified, over writing, which, as signifier, exterior sense, and thing, has only a secondary and instrumental function of translating the interiorized "full speech." It is through this full speech, present to itself, its signified, and the other, that the subject, at least according to Hegel, is related to itself in the element of ideality. Thus the meaning of being as self-presence, "speaking" to itself and perhaps divinity, is produced. Consequently logocentrism, assuming this "pure intelligibility" or presence of the signified, debases writing as non-self presence and exterior to meaning; a tool in the service of language.

For Derrida, however, the concept of writing no longer indicates a secondary form of language as communication, signification, constitution of meaning or thought. No longer an exterior surface, writing goes beyond its role as the extension of language, exceeding and comprehending language (7). In one attempt to demonstrate this, Derrida rethinks the problem of origins through Saussure, who, in trying to theorize the independence of language, complained that the spoken word becomes so bound up with the written image that writing begins to usurp the role of speech. In other words, representation mingles so intimately with what it represents that the origin becomes ungraspable. Derrida writes: "There are things like reflecting pools, and images, an infinite reference from one to the other, but no longer a source, a spring. There is no longer a simple origin. For what is reflected is split in itself and not only as an addition to itself of its image. The reflection, the image, the double, splits what it doubles. The origin of speculation becomes a difference. What can look at itself is not one" (36). Without the violence of writing, what Derrida also calls trace or difference, logos would remain within itself. So, as Plato declared, writing does entail a kind of forgetfulness, a departure of the logos from itself. Yet writing, as Derrida demonstrates, constitutes rather than translates speech, language, and subjectivity.

According to Derrida, writing must now be thought as both more exterior to speech (not its image or symbol), and more interior, since speech is already a writing.

But before it can be linked to incision, drawing, letter, or signifier, the concept of graphie implies, as the possibility common to all systems of signification, the framework of an instituted trace. This trace is the irreducible absence within presence, an absolute past which can't be awakened to the present, thought before the entity, the structure of the relation with the other, the movement of temporalization; it is the absolute origin of all sense in general which opens appearance and signification, repetition and ideality. The trace, as arche-phenomena of memory and the very movement of signification, is the opening of the first exteriority in general, the relation of inside to outside, and the relation of the living to its other. As arche-writing or spacing, it marks the dead time within the presence of a living moment; as unperceived, nonpresent, nonconscious, nonintentional, the reserve of what does not appear, it can never be merged with a phenomenology of writing (68). Yet the familiar "spatial" and "objective" exteriority we think we know is not possible without this spacing, "would not appear without the gramme, without differance as temporalization, without the presence of the other inscribed within the sense of the present, without the relationship with death as the concrete structure of the living present. Metaphor would be forbidden" (71). Moreover, "as the subject's relation with its own death, this spacing as writing is the constitution of subjectivity" (69). Writing is also the becoming-absent and becoming-unconscious of the subject; the discontinuity, discreteness, and diversion from the identity of the self-same which, in turn, it has engendered. Thus Derrida states: "Constituting and dislocating it at the same time, writing is other than the subject" (68). In addition, this "original absence of the subject of writing is also the absence of the thing or the referent" (69). Writing in a general sense, then, is the absence of both the signatory and the referent, exceeding the question *What is ?* and contingently making it possible. (41, 75).

Avoiding questions of origin and essence, Derrida does begin to offer a theory of writing and grammatological knowledge: "through all the recent work in the area, one glimpses the future extensions of a grammatology called upon to stop receiving its guiding concepts from other human sciences or, what nearly amounts to the same thing, from traditional metaphysics. A grammatology may be surmised through the wealth and novelty of information, as well as through the treatment of this information" (83). This citation raises two very important points. First, it is possible to write in an(other) way, to write beyond the liabilities of ethno and logocentrism. Second, grammatology is linked to information systems, an exciting speculation for thinking about writing in an age of electronics where mnemonic storage and retrieval systems are rapidly changing. Derrida is careful to point out, however, that although it is linked to the organization of information, grammatology cannot be subsumed as one of the sciences of man because, as we have seen, it asks first the question of the name of man. In an attempt to dislocate ethnocentrism Derrida writes: "To free unity from the concept of man is undoubtedly to renounce the old notion of peoples said to be 'without writing' and 'without history'" (83). He cites Leroi-Gourhan, who no longer describes the human adventure by the possibility of the graphie, but instead, sees the unity of man as a stage in the history of differance, the history of the gramme. Invoking a cybernetic program, Derrida points out that Leroi-Gourhan's project implies a "liberation of memory," an exteriorization of memory from instinct to electronics which "in one and the same movement constitutes and effaces so-called conscious subjectivity, its logos, and its theological attributes" (84). This "program," a term which also means writing in a public sense, "goes far beyond the

possibilities of 'intentional consciousness.' It is an emergence that makes the gramme appear *as such* (that is to say according to a new structure of nonpresence) and undoubtedly makes possible the emergence of the systems of writing in the narrow sense" (84).

In order to dislocate ethnocentrism and think about writing "outside ourselves," beyond "intentional consciousness" through an exteriorized memory, *Of Grammatology* suggests a conjunction of cybernetics and non-linear writing. Writing in the narrow sense, particularly phonetic writing, is rooted in a past of non-linear writing. Yet this history of writing as pluri-dimensional symbolic thought was suppressed by the forces of a linearization which, characterized by the successive, continuous, and chronologic features of phonetic writing's unfolding presence, became the model inhabiting philosophy and history. Linearity has begun, however, to sterilize the technical and scientific economy it had favored. The conservation of thought in electronic selection systems, as Derrida points out, profoundly transforms the nature of systems dependent on the "vulgar" temporality of the line (332). In a footnote, he speculates that "scientific thought is rather hampered by the necessity of drawing itself out in typographical channels and it is certain that if some procedure would permit the presentation of books in such a way that the materials of the different chapters are presented simultaneously in all their aspects, authors and their users would find a considerable advantage"(333). Derrida asserts that while theoretical math challenges the ideal of phonetic writing and its implicit metaphysics (history and knowledge reappropriated for presence), the development of practical methods of information retrieval move beyond this, extending the possibilities of the "message" to the point where it is no longer the written translation of a language or the transportation of a signified in its spoken integrity. Phonetic writing, for Derrida, "is limited in space and time and limits itself even as it is in the process of imposing its laws on the cultural areas that had escaped it. But the nonfortuitous conjunction of cybernetics and the 'human sciences' of writing leads to a more profound reversal" (10).

We are now reading and writing according to a different organization of space, defying the totality of the book, leaving "*man, science, and the line* behind" (87). As alternatives to linearized phonetic writing, Derrida's investigation of the graphic forms of cultures believed to be "without writing," cultures which developed outside of logocentrism, offers more specific clues for writing according to a structure of nonpresence. The cuneiform code demonstrates that a graphic signifier may have a double value: ideographic and the phonetic. In addition, the same signifier may have homophonic or polyphonic values, a quality Derrida exploits with his use of puns and other forms of word-play. Broadening this notion of writing according to a double register, the pictographic tale, for example a totemic blazon, shows how a representation of a thing may take the symbolic value of a proper name and, in turn, become an appellation with phonetic value in other series. Moreover, "its stratification may thus become very complex and go beyond the empirical consciousness linked to their immediate usage. Going beyond this real consciousness, the structure of this signifier may continue to operate not only on the fringes of potential consciousness but according to the causality of the unconscious" (89). In an earlier comment Derrida noted that for Freud, dreamwork was more comparable to writing and the hieroglyph than language or phonetic writing (68). The connection between dreamwork and hieroglyphics is

important because both structures connect words, images, and the unconscious in a writing of non-self-presence or non-propriety. Similarly, the relationship in the pictographic tale between the thing and the name demonstrates that the so-called proper name is always caught in a system of differences, "whether it be linked by its origin to the representation of things in space or whether it remains caught in a system of phonic differences or social classifications apparently released from ordinary space, the properness of the name does not escape spacing. Metaphor shapes and determines the proper name" (89). The "proper" or literal meaning, as the presence of self to the logos within its voice, does not exist, although its appearance is a "necessary function" (89). This issue is taken up later in relation to "the signature" in Signsponge, which demonstrates the possibilities for writing using the problematic of the proper name. In Of Grammatology, however, "the problem of the picture-puzzle (*rebus a transfert*) brings together all the difficulties. As pictogram, a representation of the thing may find itself endowed with phonetic value. This does not efface the "pictographic" reference which, moreover, has never been simply 'realistic.' The signifier is broken, or constellated into a system: it refers at once, and at least, to a thing and to a sound. The thing is itself a collection of things or a chain of differences 'in space'; the sound, which is also inscribed within a chain, may be a word; the inscription is then ideogrammatical or synthetic, it cannot be decomposed" (90). Referring to this picto-ideo-phono-graphic writing, Derrida suggests that "in the very interior of its non-phonetic structures, equivocity and overdetermination can give rise to metaphors taken over by a true graphic rhetoric" (90). The rebus, then, as a possibility for writing, not only subverts the metaphysics of the proper, but also suggests that a rhetoric for images is possible. This is useful for thinking about not only relations involving metaphor-as-image, but also for writing with memory systems based on the pictorial image.

Of Grammatology, then, offers a way to think about writing beyond the ethnocentrism implicit in phonetic script, beyond the linearization of unfolding presence, beyond the metaphysics of being as self-presence; a writing beyond which also constitutes the very limits it effaces. Writing according to a "structure of nonpresence" suggests an exteriorization or liberation of memory from a subjectivity anchored in presence. Thus, the subject/object split engendered through alphabetic literacy is countered with an "attempt to recapture the unity of gesture and speech, of body and language, of tool and thought, before the originality of one to the other is articulated" (86). Inhabiting hieroglyphic writings and particularly electronic systems of information storage and retrieval, memory is exteriorized according to the logic of dreamwork and pluri-dimensional symbolic thought, suggesting "an 'overtaking' of speech by the machine" (79). Thus Derrida rejects the idea of the book, the totality of the signifier constituted by a pre-existing signified, as profoundly alien to the sense of writing (18). He asserts: "The end of linear writing is indeed the end of the book, even if, even today, it is within the form of the book that new writings-- literary or theoretical-- allow themselves to be, for better or worse, encased" (86).

Encased in the form of the book, Of Grammatology initially appears to adopt the structure of a typically rigorous academic treatise which, setting out to explore a problem, intends to offer solutions or explanations. Yet Derrida's "explanations" seem difficult to follow, a phenomenon which some readers attribute to their own lack of philosophical expertise, inability to concentrate, or a purposeful elusiveness. But if we take seriously

Derrida's suggestion that writing no longer favors denotation and signification but connotation and style, then we should question our hermeneutic expectations and anticipate another sort of knowledge formation. While Derrida emphasizes that grammatology cannot function as a positive science since it is produced through a writing of nonpresence, *Of Grammatology* does offer suggestions which help us to think about this "other" writing. But *Signsponge*, also encased in the form of the book, functions even less like an explanation and more like an example as it simultaneously interrogates the status of explanation and example; it is writing working according to a structure of nonpresence, producing "scenes" of writing which show the subject-writer-in-a-language, *at work*" (26).

Interrogating the difficulty of textual citation, of repeating that which is by definition unique, Derrida shows that "there is a law and a typology of the idiom" which problematizes not only the notion of "reference," but the viability of literary "explication" as well. In relation to his "reading" of Francis Ponge, Derrida comments: "I believe in fact he cannot be explained, having readied everything for this in various texts which explain themselves very well, and in such a way that everything can be found there, in addition to that remainder which prevents an explanatory discourse from ever attaining saturation" (30). Consequently, *Signsponge* is a sort of joke on two opposed but similar schools of literary interpretation, one which attempts to recover the author's intention in writing, and another which denies any motivation between author and text. Like the philosopher who believes he has signed the text in his own name yet "denies the idiom of his name, of his language, of his circumstance, speaking in concepts and generalities that are necessarily improper," both positions fail to take into account the effects of the signature, "how all this is affected by the logic of the unconscious, the structure of the language, the paradoxes of name and reference, of nomination and description, the links between common and proper names, names of things and personal names, the proper and the non-proper" (24, 26). For Derrida, the text of Francis Ponge "opens up a science of these questions. Which it puts into practice and into the abyss. For me, Francis Ponge is someone first of all who has known that, in order to know what goes on in the name and the thing, one has to get busy with one's own, let oneself be occupied by it" (26). Consequently Derrida will "make a scene," producing "small writings" (*sapates*) in order to "have it out with the signature, with his [Ponge], mine, perhaps, and with the other's" (30, 32). For Derrida, the signature doesn't explain anything (118). It produces, through antonomasia, the "emblematic story of my name as the story of the other, beloved blason of the 'impossible subject,' a fable and another way of making history, of writing a story" (102). Yet it is important to keep in mind that the signature is just one strategy among other possibilities; it is an organizing principle whereby the proper name provides "at times a very strict, and at other times a lateral and derivative, organizational function" (116).

How can we lure the other to sign? There are three modalities of the signature which both Derrida and Ponge fold together. The first is the common notion of signature as representing the proper name, for example the inscription at the bottom of a check. The second level of the signature refers to the writer's style, a signature we are taught to recognize without the aid of the proper name. The third and more complicated modality is the general signature, "the signature of the signature, the fold of the placement in abyss where, after the manner of the signature in the current sense, the work of writing

designates, describes, and inscribes itself as act (action and archive), signs before the end by affording us the opportunity to read: I refer to myself, this is writing, I am writing, this is writing-- which excludes nothing since, when the placement in abyss succeeds, and is thereby decomposed and produces an event, it is the other, the thing as other, that signs" (52, 54). This "putting into abyss" involves inserting the "proper name" back into the text through antonomasia, which means turning a proper name into a common name and vice versa. By turning the proper name into a thing, which may include exploring related homonyms, puns, metonymies, and etymologies as well as following certain cadences of rhythm (Francis, fringe, fracture, fragment, frankness), Derrida shows that the proper name is necessarily improper, impure; it can never be simply literal nor proper unto itself. So, for example, Derrida, using the *deja* or "already" in his name, reads Ponge's text through figures such as the sponge and the sponge towel in order to let the other sign first, to see what anticipates, interests, or regards the name in language. Thus this "stony monumentalization" of the name, its insertion as a common thing into the body of the text, is also a loss of ownership: "The erection-tomb falls. Step, and stop, of man" (56). In other words, by turning the name into a thing or the signature into a rebus, the proper name disappears, producing a loss of ownership over the text but also creating a chance for the other to sign. With the countersignature "I interest the thing that regards me, I interest it in signing itself, by itself, and in becoming, while remaining the thing it is, entirely other, also a cosigned part of my text. This is also the condition allowing my text to escape me and fly like a rocket along the path of its own trajectory, freed up, in my name and in the laws of my name, from my name and my language" (128).

This "freeing up of the text" blocks intentionality, frustrating hermeneutic responses while shifting the ground of literary interpretation away from explanation and toward a kind of odd translation. Derrida writes *with*, not about, Ponge's text. Far from either an interpretation of Ponge or an exercise in wordplay, Derrida demonstrates an alternative way of organizing and generating material without the intention or presence of the subject. Moreover, he writes with the idiomatic signature in order to produce a general theory; in this case, "the sponge is, above all else, writing" (70). As a thing, the sponge of Ponge "not only constitutes the term of an analogy (allegory or metaphor), but also constitutes, in addition, the very medium of all figures, metaphoricity itself" (72). In this sense, the "undecidability" of the sponge as a word-thing, mixing pure and impure or proper and improper, emblemizes the structure of writing as differance. The rebus signature demonstrates how the "science of the alea," the "motivation" between Ponge's text and his name, is a general theory of non-logocentric writing. Derrida writes: "The proper name, in its aleatoriness, should have no meaning and should spend itself in immediate reference. But the chance and misery of its arbitrary character (always other in each case), is that its inscription in language always affects it with a potential for meaning, and for no longer being proper once it has a meaning (the "hygienic sigh" of *The insignificant*). It becomes meaningful once again, of limited range, once it is reinvested with semantic content. It starts to re-enter the framework of a general science that governs the effects of the alea. This is the point where we can start to *translate*" (120, my emphasis). This translation process, as writing "otherwise," will be made more explicit in Derrida's introduction to Abraham and Torok's *The Wolf Man's Magic Word*.

At this point, it is important to remember that "what engages us in writing is what happens in the middle, between them: the intermediaries (names and things), the

witnesses, the intercessors, the events that go on between them, the interested ones" (52). For Derrida, the event of the encounter with the thing as momentary partner or cosigner is *emotional* (128). Ponge's washing machine, for example, as an object and a writing that should produce things "clean and proper," renders an erotic image of the housewife washing. As Derrida points out, it is the "underclothes" of writing, "the erotic scene" of the text, "that brings the signer into the text every time" (38). But in addition, the "coitus of signatures" which causes the other to come into the event always involves a sense of loss: "he, facing the washing machine, is the washing machine that describes the washing machine, which, however, can do very nicely without him" (38). Again, writing is the becoming-absent and becoming-unconscious of the subject; it is the subject's relation with its own death (Grammatology 68-9). This "tomb" sense of signature, as the "fall" of the signature when it is "monumentalized," is a Derridean pun on loss and mourning, concepts which reappear in "Fors." In fact, the "story without event in the traditional sense of the word" which Derrida produces in Signsponge as "a fable and another way of making history, of writing a story," uses strategies strikingly similar to Abraham and Torok's tale of the Wolf Man's cryptonymy (102). The "story of my name as a story of the other" is perhaps most poignantly told through the Wolf Man who, having no proper name, seemed to call himself by the "unspeakable name of the Thing (tieret)". "He, but who?" writes Derrida, "The Thing is part of a symbol. It no longer calls itself. The entire body of a proper name is always shattered by the *topoi*. As for the "word" that says the thing in the word-thing, it is not even a noun but a verb, a whole collapsed sentence, the operation of a sentence and the sentence of an operation engaging several subjects, several instances, several name bearers, several places" ("Fors," xlv). Calling himself by the name of the thing, the Wolf Man literally embodies a refusal to sign in a single stroke or return to the proper name/place of the father. In The Magic Word we witness, once again, another erotically charged scene of washing as Abraham and Torok attempt to decipher the Wolf Man's memory/dream screen of Grusha, the floor scrubber. But multiple translations/transferences are taking place simultaneously as Magic Word, like Signsponge, operates on at least two levels, constructing the "analysis" of the Wolf Man's crypt, its language and its method, but also, according to Derrida, the crypt of an analysis: "its crypt in the act of decrypting"(xxiv). What interests grammatology is the "force" (fors) of the crypt, its general relation to memory and emotion, but more specifically, the rebus writing it produces and the translation process it provokes.

The relevance of psychoanalysis for grammatology is that both attempt to answer the same question: "How can we include in a discourse, *any* discourse, that which, being the very condition of the discourse, would by its very essence escape discourse? (xxxii). In other words, the effort of psychoanalysis to represent the Unconscious (that which cannot be known), encounters the same paradoxical problem as grammatology's attempt to represent differance (by definition nonpresent): "to grasp through language the very source from which language emanates" (xxxii). "To say it without saying it. To show/hide" is precisely the analysts' description of the Wolf Man's rebus; a description re-markable for grammatologists in at least two ways (22). First, the Wolf Man's rebus may be a model for writing with the other, and second, this writing requires a different kind of reading and "critical" writing, as the analysts' response suggests. In Magic Word, Abraham and Torok must respond to "the uniqueness of the Wolf Man's case: the

radical exclusion of words of desire" by actually *inventing* a method, and ultimately a genre, for working through his fantastic memory tableaux (21). They cannot follow standard techniques of decipherment because the encrypted words act like things, moving through the language of the crypt along anti-semantic routes that are neither metaphoric nor metonymic (xiii). According to Derrida, cryptonymy does not "consist in representing-hiding one word by another, one thing by another, a thing by a word or a word by a thing, but in picking out from the extended series of allosemes, a term that then (in a second-degree distancing) is translated into a synonym" (xli-ii). For example the scar, a real symptom, is the representation of one of the synonyms of the encrypted word's allosemes discovered when the analysts move back and forth between their Russian and French dictionaries: "natieret," which means "to wound oneself," also means "to rub," producing the encrypted word "tieret." Consequently, the hieroglyphs produced through the "angular, zigzagging procedure" of cryptonymy have nothing to do with the standard rhetorical tropes of metaphor or metonymy because, according to Derrida, "the allosemic pathways in this strange relay-race pass through non-semantic associations, purely phonetic contaminations," and "these associations in themselves constitute words or parts of words that act like visible and/or audible bodies or things" (xlii). Once banished as a "Thing of the cryptic unconscious," the word-thing can only return to consciousness along two routes: as an alloseme fixed in a tableau or symptom (Grusha scrubbing the floor), or as the alloseme's synonym in the form of a cryptonym (xlii-iii). The Wolf Man's memory, which by definition cannot recall the encrypted words, is able, however, to re-present them. The "living dead" fetish words, defying the "normal" substitutive routes of metaphor and metonymy, nonetheless return, transfigured in an(other) way. Acting as word-things translated through the angular and crystalline structure of language, the cryptonyms are restaged as transformed childhood memories and dreams which "say it without saying it."

Recognizing that the Wolf Man's "excluded words" can return only as rebuses, Abraham and Torok posit that the "hieroglyphic model at work everywhere is more, and other, than an analogical model. It implies on the one hand, of course, that the ultimate object still remains, even as a "proper" name or body, a text *to be deciphered*, but it also implies that that writing is not essentially verbal or phonetic" (xxix). In determining how to decipher these rebuses, Abraham and Torok follow the Wolf Man's lead and formulate a method based on the "anasemic conversion" of concepts, a procedure that works by "designifying along the lines of an antisemantics" (xiii). Summarized by Derrida, anasemia consists of three elements: narrative, angle, and sepulcher. The narrative: the anasemic structure describes a story or a fable "called for within the concept" being translated; "the story is described as a path followed backward by the structure in order to reach all the way back beyond the origin, which is nonetheless not in any way a proper, rightful, literal meaning". In the "course of this journey," the memory trip back to the crypt where "an event that took place without ever having been," the concept is "re-cited" (xxxiv). The angle: created by anasemia, the angle is within the word itself. "The anasemic operation does not result in a growing explicitness," instead, "a change in direction abruptly interrupts the continuity of the process of becoming explicit and imposes on it an anasemic angulation" (xxxiv). This angulation is produced through homonyms and allosemes of the word. The sepulcher: "It is from out of the possibility of this "loss" or the death of the subject, from out of the possibility of a sepulcher, in one

form or another, that the entire theoretical space is distributed." Thus "the anasemic process inaugurates a mytho-poetic arch-psychoanalytic science that diverts its account toward another event that takes place where it has never been," another crypt (xxxiv).

This "analysis" of the Wolf Man's crypt, its anasemic method, is a doubly important model for grammatological writing because, as Derrida suggests, this analysis of a crypt also demonstrates the crypt of an analysis: "its crypt in the act of decrypting"(xxiv). In other words, what Abraham and Torok have demonstrated is "the cryptic structure of the ultimate referent," the fact that the event instituting the crypt can never appear, since the Thing is encrypted (xxvi). Consequently, analysis is the "translation of an 'established text' into an 'invented' text' according to Derrida, keeping in mind that "the original is only an asymptomatic place of 'convergences' among all the possible translations and betrayals, an interminable approximation of the idiom" where "the original is already marked with a fiction" (xxvi). Thus, "if fiction already opens the possibility of an 'original,' the account that translates the original must for its part move forward 'in the mode of fiction'; even if the story cannot be reduced simply to a fiction, it is like an 'imaginary voyage'" (xxvi-ii). It is in this sense that Magic Word, as the story of a story, recounting "its own *history as a story*," not only relates to the event that instituted the crypt, but also, in doing so, transforms the concept of the Thing: "this Thing is not the thing-in-itself philosophers speak of. It is a mark or a cipher, a piece of a cipher that can only be *translated* into a vast interminable sentence or into the scene of a tableau with more than one subject, more than one object, more than one entrance or exit. A trace with no present in its wake, *a Thing, ein Ding, une Chose* without a cause" (xxvi, xlv). If, as Derrida asserts, "one can no more separate the concept of anasemia from a certain concept of translation," and Abraham and Torok use anasemia in a "rigorous faithfulness of transcription" in order to produce "the same, but another," text, then this notion of translation and simulacrum definitely moves analysis away from explanation (xxxiii). Derrida writes: "'Psychoanalysis lithographia' frequently comes back to the necessity of 'the poetic,' of a 'poetic truth' that loses nothing in breaking with 'veracity,' the scientific, naively objectivist, or realist form of epistemological consensus. The question here is not one of reaching a perfectly matching equivalence with any 'hidden reality' (although . . . , he says, smiling, 'sometimes a coincidence . . . '), but rather of finding out *through what*, by what means or process, the analyzed person's discourse 'becomes a work of art.' 'And now that has been done, it seems to me.' But only another work of art, in its turn, could answer that question, and *do it* " (xxviii).

Abraham and Torok's analysis of the Wolf Man is the "rhythmic, step-by-step tale of the act of deciphering, decrypting, itself dramatic, the tale of a tale" in which the analysts' desire "is never left obscure" (xxiii). Like Ponge, who shows "his body in the process of writing, his relation to the material of language, to the dictionary that he manipulates, to the editorial machine, to the underside of the apparatus of production, hiding nothing of his ideology, his politics, his economy, of the place or time of the circumstance, etc.," Abraham and Torok take their readers on a tour of the process of their work (Signsponge 20,22). But even as their "desire invests the entire space, is part of the operation, and even gives it its first push," Derrida points out that "that desire is also the desire to save" (xxiii). By writing Magic Word, by producing this "commemorative monument," the "force" (*fors*) of the analysts' "double desire" to save the Wolf Man's analysis, as well as themselves, is saved and kept safe (*for*): "It is part of

what is shown there and part of what, as is always the case with force, escapes representation" (xxiv-v). What Abraham and Torok show/hide is the analyst working in his or her own name, as what is kept safe (*for*), in turn, provokes engagement (*fors*): "The Wolf Man's Magic Word shows how a sign, having become arbitrary, can remotivate itself. And into what labyrinth, what multiplicity of heterogeneous places, one must enter in order to track down the cryptic motivation, for example in the case of *TR*, when it is marked by a proper-name effect (here, *tieret*), and when, consequently, it no longer belongs simply to the internal system of language. Such motivation does nevertheless function within the system and no linguistic consciousness can deny it. For example, when *Turok* (Turk, the Turkish flag in the dream of the moon with the star) says (?), means (?), translates (?), points out (?), represents (?), or *in any case* also imitates, induces the word-thing *tieret*. *For example*" (xlvii). Demonstrating the problem of the law and typology of the idiom, this example returns us to Signsponge and the signature. In the infinite repetition of that which is supposedly unique, "the example of nothing other ever," something always other remains. (Signsponge, 20). For Derrida, Magic Word shows us how the example, as a word-thing, goes beyond explanation, beyond intention, beyond an internalized consciousness speaking-to-itself, revealing an(other) identificatory desire. The example, rather than illustrating or illuminating its object, offers the potential to write beyond it. If we cannot comprehend the secret in the safe, we can, like the Wolf Man, Abraham and Torok, and Derrida, write with it's force. We are all writing out of the crypt, out of what remains without presence; it is through this piece of the other, a ghostly outside secretly lodged inside, that we are able to translate, to continue writing.

III.

Although Derrida states there can be no method for grammatology, the "exteriorization of memory" reintroduces the question of method in relation to grammatological practices. If, as Frances Yates points out in *The Art of Memory*, method is a product of memory technologies, then grammatological writing transforms established methodological practices. Reflecting a "literate" psyche, Peter Ramus' "dialectical order" of memorization has been accepted as the "natural" basis for scientific method. But perhaps, following Ong's suggestion that electronic memory is a "secondary orality," Yates' examination of other memory systems may provide a useful basis for speculating about alternatives to scientific method. The remaining texts discussed in this section also suggest possibilities for methodological alternatives.

Locating the 16th century as a pivotal point for mnemonics and systems of learning, Yates cites Hugo's prediction in *Notre Dame de Paris* that the storage and dissemination capabilities of the printed book would make the cathedral, which served as a huge memory theatre or image bank dedicated to the transmission of cultural knowledge, obsolete (124). But instead of disappearing, the art of memory becomes transformed, promoting and reflecting changes in the Renaissance psyche which initiate the quest for method. The word "method" was popularized by Ramus, an educational reformer not unlike Plato (369). In an attempt to abolish rote memorization, which had become the only recognized art of memory within rhetoric, Ramus invents a new system for memory based the dialectical order of dichotomised classifications. Displaying the extent to which literacy had invaded the human psyche, Ramus asserted that an imageless, abstract order of dialectical analysis was "natural" to the mind (234). But other practitioners of memory, such as Lull, Camillo, and Bruno, also created systems that initiated the development of method.

"To think is to speculate with images," writes Bruno in a misinterpretation of Aristotle's dictum. Remotivating the classical memory emphasis on personal image and place, Bruno invents a series of memory rooms out of personally striking images and fills them with the expert discourses of culture. This move was not, in itself, revolutionary, since Camillo had already combined personal images and the discourses of Cicero into a "constructed mind and soul" capable of charting causality, and Lull had placed blocks of knowledge on combinatory wheels in order to produce "an art of investigation" (132, 185). But it is Bruno who combines Camillo and Lull's systems by placing personal images, expert discourse, and popular astrological notations on revolving combinatory wheels. For Yates, there is "method in this madness" as Bruno attempts to invent a "celestial mechanics" by compulsively adding more and more wheels and memory rooms, creating "endless semantic possibilities" (306). Bruno writes: "We institute a method, not about things, but the significance of things" (294). While Ramus' methodology contributed to the development of abstract analysis and scientific method, Yates hints that Bruno's system suggests other possibilities.

According to Yates, Bruno's *Cena*, demonstrates "how the art of memory could as it were develop into a literature; how the streets of memory places could become populated with characters, could become the backcloth for a drama" (312). Bruno's system uses the storage capacity of Camillo's theatre, which adds the expert text and

critical distance of Cicero's literacy with the associative imagery and dramatic aspects of oral memory, in conjunction with the aleatory and non-linear combinatory strategies of mechanical wheels or, in the case of the *Cena*, a tour. Consequently, Bruno's practice of method not only reflects knowledge, but begins to generate it in unusual ways. Using the metaphor of the tour for information retrieval, Bruno's literature of invention suggests to Yates the possibilities for a dramatic methodology wherein literature becomes just as capable of generating knowledge as science. A practice of method which combines the literate qualities of abstraction and causality with the oral characteristics of imagery, associative logic, and personal emotion fits nicely into Ong's speculations for an electronic paradigm. In addition, Bruno's wheels hint at Derrida's machinic aspect of language and the exteriorization of memory. If, as Derrida suggests, style replaces logic in grammatology, Yates' hints about mnemonic literature signal possible alterations in method and cognition. As Bruno's user/tourist moves through the concatenation of personal, popular, and expert discourses, method is transformed through both a reinscription of the body *and* machinic mnemonics.

The complex relationships between technology, memory, cognition and methods of representation are grammatological concerns which appear again and again throughout various disciplines. In *Tropics of Discourse*, Hayden White argues that history is a method with no distinct object; historians actually constitute their subjects as objects of representation through the language, or tropes, they use to identify and describe them (57, 95)). Consequently, "we should no longer expect that statements given correspond to a preexistent body of raw facts" because "what constitutes the facts themselves is the problem that the historian, like the artist, has tried to solve in the metaphor by which he orders his world" (18). Making an analogy between historiography and psychotherapy, White suggests that both methodologies refamiliarize us with forgotten or repressed events, and neither produce exact recall. In fact, Freud's "dreamwork" is equivalent to tropes in language and transformational patterns in conceptual thought, providing a translation between imaginative and ratiocinative faculties, perception and conception, description and argument, mimesis and diegesis (14). The key point here is that the *style* chosen to represent experience, not logic or the experience itself, provides the system of translation and cognition we associate with explanation and justification. Consequently, history must avail itself of both art and science, since the foundation of rational knowledge is "poetic logic" (7). White points out that the contemporary "art" of history is based on the style of the 19th century novel, which is only one possible mode of "explanation." Thus White calls for the "plunder" of psychoanalysis, game theory, cybernetics, expressionism, impressionism, existentialism, surrealism, etc, as alternative methods of representation (47). In the spirit of grammatology's emphasis on style and refusal of origin, *Tropics of Discourse* demonstrates that the representation of knowledge, like memory, is no longer "objectively" reflective, but constructive. The "dramatization" of data does not mean that history falls prey to fictionalization in the service of propaganda or ideology, but that "by drawing historiography nearer to its origins in literary sensibility, we should be able to identify the ideological, because it is fictive, element in our own discourse" (47, 99). Thus the metaphors we use to constitute knowledge are both instructive, in the sense of pointing to an ideology we can't get "outside," and generative, in their richness and capacity to poetically reinvent the world.

James Clifford also addresses the relationship between representation and cognition in The Predicament of Culture, where he seems to take up at least two of White's suggestions. First, Clifford explores the use of an art model, surrealism, for ethnographic research; a move which also responds to another statement from White: "we require a history that will educate us to discontinuity" (White, 50). According to Clifford, Bataille's journal Documents provides "an epistemological horizon for 20th century cultural studies" (134). Presupposing the fragmentation of modern culture perceived by Benjamin in "The Storyteller," which describes the transition from communication based on narrative to a cultural style characterized by "bursts of information" such as the photograph, the newspaper, and the shocks of the modern city, Documents is a "playful museum that simultaneously collects and reclassifies its objects." through juxtaposition and fortuitous collage (119, 132). Laying all its images on the same plane (a movie clip, a show advertisement, a mask, a newspaper clipping, a Giacometti, ect.), Documents defies conceptions of organic structure, wholeness, or historical continuity (131). Through its taxonomic play, Documents redefines the familiar; the definition for "homme" relies on chemical compositions of the body, so "man" becomes "enough iron to make a nail" (132). "What's called for, then, is an ethno(GRAPHIC) poetics," notes Clifford, outlining ethnographic surrealism and surrealist ethnography as the mock and remix of art and science (147).

Clifford also cites the work of Michel Leiris, whose L'Afrique fantome "questions the scientific distinctions between 'subjective' and 'objective' practices" (142). As a member of the College of Sociology, Leiris was among those who envisioned a critical "ethnography of the quotidian"; an ethnography analytically rigorous and yet poetic, which included dreams and other bodily responses usually suppressed as important parts of fieldwork data (142-3). According to Clifford, Leiris cultivates a "methodological clumsiness" in his "book that isn't one," addressing the reader with "Warning-- this book is unreadable" (142, 166). Unconcerned with including things that didn't fit, Leiris employs a "method of concrete knowledge" to write an ethnographic travel diary of self-exploration: "travel as a poetic adventure" (165). Concerned with issues of genre and narrative form, principles of inclusion and exclusion, Leiris attempts to "be in facts like a child," to "outmaneuver" narrative through another way of telling based on the snapshot (this was, this was, this was,...) (168-70). For Leiris, the objective stance reveals itself as an effect of style (172). Defending a rigorous subjectivity, "the right to record a dream or shit along with events," L'Afrique fantome is open to chance, ideas, problems, and fantasies, as it demonstrates a writing process that poses and recomposes identities (170, 173). For Clifford, Leiris is the first professional ethnographer to analyze colonialism as inescapable ideological ground: "Perhaps there's no return for anyone to a native land-- only field notes for its reinvention" (173).

Other practitioners of the quotidian are Michel de Certeau and Walter Benjamin. In The Practice of Everyday Life, the split between everyday practices and the "scenario" of the science laboratory provokes Certeau to inquire into the "underside" of scientific activity, to explore the tactics of producing knowledge which are typically neglected by the epistemology of science or concealed by the "rationality" of Western culture. Most suggestive for grammatologists is Certeau's investigation of a "logic of practices" which "brings into play a "popular" ratio, a way of thinking invested in a away of acting, an art

of combination which cannot be dissociated from an art of using"; in short, "an art of manipulating and enjoying" which both acknowledges and produces knowledge through daily practices. (xv, xxii) Certeau crosses figures of rhetoric with the tactics of everyday practices in a "poetic making-do." The turns or tropes in language which produce the displacements or "ruses" eliminated from scientific reason and "proper" meaning provide styles of thought and action which, for Certeau, become models of practice. Consequently, daily operations such as reading, walking, traveling, and shopping, as well as clever tricks, storytelling, or a hunter's cunning, manipulate and create spaces. In other words, the habits of daily practice not only transform and produce space (physical and discursive), they also transform and produce knowledge that is "habitable."

For Certeau, literature marks the return of what has been eliminated from science, acknowledging "that part of knowledge of which knowledge does not speak" (197). In other words, literature "dramatizes" the question of the other. For Certeau, "a theory of narration is indissociable from a theory of practices, as its condition as well as its production" (78). Thus the novel, as a "zoo of everyday practices," is not simply a recounting, but is a "know-how-to-say exactly adjusted to its object, and, as such, no longer the Other of knowledge" (78). It belongs to the art of "making a coup," a "discourse characterized more by a way of exercising itself than by the thing it indicates. ... It produces effects, not objects" (79). According to Certeau, narration concerns the *style* of tactics. Tales, stories, poems, and treatises are already practices that say what they do without requiring any gloss; one re-cites them. Certeau cites the oral tradition analyzed by Goody: "it is a way of retelling the consequences and combinations of formal operations, along with an art of "harmonizing" them with the circumstances and the audience" (80). Thus, the story does not express a practice, but makes it (81).

Scientific writing, as the constitution of a proper place, "ceaselessly reduces time ... to the normality of an observable and readable system" (89). Consequently, it works to avert the surprises that storytelling acknowledges and embraces as constituting a kind of knowledge. Certeau links storytelling to *metis*, a Greek term for a spectrum of behaviors from sleights of hand and cleverness to tricks and know-how. Through its dynamic "turns," *metis* uses encyclopedic "flashes of memory" to "illuminate occasions." These "occasions," which bring together heterogeneous dimensions and, through their insertion into a sequence of elements, distort relationships in a "flash repartee," concentrate the most knowledge in the least time: "Reduced to its smallest format, in an act transforming the situation, this concrete encyclopedia is a virtual philosopher's stone!" (83, 88).

Working in the forcefield of art, technology, and the everyday, Walter Benjamin is another critic who denies traditional academic hermeneutics, favoring instead the power of images to make philosophical points concretely: "I have nothing to say, only to show" (Buck-Morss, 73). Emerging from several areas simultaneously, his images intermingle childhood anecdotes, avant-garde art, everyday habits, popular and high culture through a cognitive framework altered by the shocks of modern technology and the unconscious workings of "involuntary memory." Highlighting the "mutual penetration of art and science," Benjamin notes: "By close-ups of the things around us, by focusing on hidden details of familiar objects, by exploring commonplace milieus under the ingenious guidance of the camera, the film, on the one hand, extends our

comprehension of the necessities which rule our lives; on the other hand, it manages to assure us of an immense and unexpected field of action. Our taverns and our metropolitan streets, our offices and furnished rooms, our railroad stations and our factories appeared to have us locked up hopelessly. Then came the film and burst this prison-world asunder by the dynamite of a tenth of a second, so that now, in the midst of its far-flung ruins and debris, we calmly and adventurously go traveling. The camera introduces us to unconscious optics as does psychoanalysis to unconscious impulses" (Illuminations, 236-7). As Clifford pointed out, Benjamin's critical methodology mimes the modern rhythms of the city, the technology of the camera, or the layout of the newspaper; these quotidian events fracture experience, but reconnect the body and mind, uniting theory and action to political effect.

Benjamin bases the capacity for invention on mimetic representation, often demonstrated in the learning processes of children who produce new intuitive relationships, or new possibilities for meaning, through the unpredictable and tactile manipulation of objects (Reflections, 69). For Benjamin, these inventive relationships demonstrate a connection between perception and action which is not based on causality, but similarity, and leads to atypical correspondences. The surrealists represent a more drastic form of this kind of play, inflected with a logic of the unconscious. Thus Benjamin transforms the disciplines of history and literary criticism through a method based on the trial combinations and changing relationships of childhood play, the juxtaposition of filmic montage, and the shocks of surrealist logic. Yet he does so within the frame of an "involuntary" memory, a "Proustian" memory based not on purposeful recollection, but on the intersection between the body and the unconscious; images triggered unconsciously by objects, sights, or smells. "What, in the end, makes advertisements so superior to criticism? Not what the moving red neon sign says-- but the fiery pool reflecting it in the asphalt" (Reflections, 86).

As Susan Buck-Morss observes in The Dialectics of Seeing, Benjamin's objects are blasted out of history's continuum according to a "visual, not linear, logic," which was to "connect the shock of awakening with the discipline of remembering" (218, 272). For Benjamin, decaying or outdated objects perform the work of philosophy and incite the action of revolution by clashing past and present, public and personal histories in "flashing images" which mark the "now of recognition." What is perhaps most interesting about Buck-Morss' book on Benjamin's unfinished Arcades Project, is the fact that she attempts to use Benjamin's methodology to produce her own project on Benjamin. The "Afterimages" section provides "flashes of memory" such as "Automatons," where a Benjaminian quote about mechanical dolls is juxtaposed with a modern ad depicting a beautiful woman (a "doll") wearing contact lenses. The facing page displays two images, one outside the Paris Arcades in 1936 which depicts fathers trying to encourage resistant little girls to watch wind-up toys, and a similar image from New York in 1988 where the little girls are staring up, enraptured, at a large robot. Both images are entitled "Childhood Reception" (364). In the midst of this "recasting of literary forms," "the conventional distinction between genres, between writer and poet, between scholar and popularizer" break down, revising "even the distinction between author and reader" (Reflections, 224, 225).

For Benjamin, there is always a potential history in the messianic time of any historical moment, latent possibilities which may emerge in the flashing "now of recognition." In Peter Sloterdijk's Critique of Cynical Reason, the character of Diogenes is that possibility. Culled from history, Diogene's story offers Sloterdijk a site from which he extrapolates a kynical practice of history resistant to Enlightenment cynicism. This cynicism, according to Sloterdijk, is the result of the failure of the Enlightenment project; the inability of reason and rationality to adequately explain or prevent horrors such as the Holocaust.

The dominant method in our culture is the product of literacy; it is scientific, analytic, and objective. The alternative which Sloterdijk suggests involves a surrender to the object, to erotics (359). The kynical is a demonstration that teaches, a critique that uses bodily actions as an argument. As an act, the kynical gesture is the scandalous move, saying things that no one would say aloud, telling the secret, revealing the taboo, displaying the private act in public. By acting out a critique, "embodiment" actually shows the involvement of the self in the process of understanding.

In How Societies Remember, Paul Connerton argues that we learn by what we see and do. In other words, our habits are our methods: "Our oppositional concepts of "up" and "down" arise out of our bodily experience of verticality. ... It is through the essentially embodied nature of our social existence, and through the incorporated practices based upon the embodying, that these oppositional terms provide us with the metaphors by which we think and live. Culturally specific postural performances provide us with a mnemonics of the body" (74). Since we have incorporated the institutional habits of literate memory, we must rethink these practices in relation to our current electronic memory, or secondary orality.

"Habits are not just a sign," writes Connerton, and "meaning cannot be reduced to a sign which exists on a separate 'level' outside the immediate sphere of the body's acts" (95). In other words, not only do we think through our bodies, but our bodily practices constitute a kind of intelligence ignored, repressed, or unrecognized through analytic methods. This knowledge operates from the "inside," as desires, values, and meanings which can only be "inhabited"; Connerton cites the distinction Proust makes between "being able to recognize a code and being able to incorporate it" (90). Using the example of learning to play jazz, Connerton concludes: "Habit is a knowledge and a remembering in the hands and in the body; and in the cultivation of habit it is our body which "understands" (95). Sloterdijk's kynical gesture, as an embodiment of critique, can disrupt habituated patterns from the inside, so to speak. "Doctors can examine the results," says Connerton, but "actors can mimic the impressions" (94).

While the "official memory" of history, like traditional academic writing, may assume the objective legitimacy of critical distance, Connerton shows that history is, in fact, an habituated practice of writing already encoded with the cultural dominance inherent to logocentrism. As he points out, our daily rituals enact our ideology; my embarrassment in wearing the same clothes two days in row keeps me integrated into consumer culture. Connerton's example of Chinese foot-binding is perhaps more to the point (!33). The "habit memory" of rituals and practices inherent in our daily gestures triggers the body's cultural repository, making available a kind of unacknowledged knowledge which actually *performs* subjectivity. And if, as Connerton asserts, incorporated practices provide us with the metaphors by which we think and live, we can

actually write ourselves. In other words, the performances of incorporated practices offer enormous metaphoric potential for altering the rituals of institutionalized (literate) learning habits.

In Reflections on Gender and Science, Evelyn Fox Keller describes how the control and domination of nature as the dominant image of modern science has its roots in the Baconian metaphor of a chaste and lawful marriage. According to Bacon, a marriage between man and nature bound nature to man's service and domination. In contrast, the alchemists' "less masculine" science depended on the image of coitus: "In allowing a kinship between knowledge and erotic sexuality, and between experimental and spiritual knowledge, alchemical science not only failed to demarcate Nature adequately: it failed to demarcate the 'Bounds of sober Enquiry'-- the domain of proper knowledge" (58-9). The point Keller is making is that: "the metaphor of a marriage between mind and nature does not look the same to them [male scientists] as it does to women. ... In a science constructed around the naming of object (nature) as female and the parallel naming of subject (mind) as male, any scientist who happens to be a woman is confronted with an *a priori* contradiction in terms. This poses a critical problem of identity. ... Her alternative is to attempt a radical redefinition of terms" (174-5). Keller emphasizes that a methodology which allows for difference must "listen to the material" through self-reflection and pattern recognition. But the terms or metaphors which always frame research must come from subjective identification; the researcher introduces herself in the method. While Keller locates the feminist challenge to scientific method through describing feminist ways of working which incorporate identification and self-reflection, Trihn T. Mihn-Ha actually *performs* feminist research through "writing the body."

Trihn responds to the grammatological position which defines method as specific to alphabetic institutions by working an (other) way in Woman, Native, Other. If writing is a technology for storing information and turning it into knowledge, Trihn emphasizes, like other ethnographers in this paper, that this knowledge is always positioned. She focuses on the practice of writing, explicitly aligning grammatology with feminism through "writing the body." In the "Grandma's Story" chapter Trihn demonstrates learning through storytelling, which is a form of embodiment: "when she composes on life she not only gives information, entertains, develops, or expands the imagination. Not only educates. Only practices a craft" (126). As Connerton proposes, the crafts may serve as methodologies for informal memory, as vehicles for the displacement of institutional learning habits, or the rearrangement of disciplinary knowledge. Writing, according to Trihn, should be exercised as a kind of craft practice of thinking, learning and speculating.

For Trihn, grammatological writing is embodied, and therefore performative. While the typical position of the author is above or before her work, Trihn expresses a desire to write *simultaneously with* it (6). She points out that writing reduced to a vehicle for thought may be useful to orient a goal or act, but does not constitute an act in itself (16). "A distinction needs to be made between 'Write yourself. Write your body' and write about yourself, your body, your inner life, your fears, inhibitions, desires, and pleasures. The first refers to a *scriptive act*-- the emergence of the writing self-- the

second, to the consolidation of writing from the self" (28, italics mine). While alphabetic literacy does produce a particular subject formation, Trihn posits a grammatological writing which still involves subject-effects, but in a more general and pluralistic way: "writing, like a game that defies its own rules, is an ongoing practice that may be said to be concerned, not with inserting a 'me' into language, but with creating an opening where the 'me' disappears while 'I' endlessly come and go" (35). Like Roland Barthes' A Lover's Discourse, Woman, Native, Other "stages" informal memories, revealing the body as not only socially inscribed, but also a site for producing knowledge through performance rather than critique. While Barthes "composes the amorous subject" through ordinary, insistent, and occasional readings, conversations from friends, and his own life, Trihn also tells her story(s) through a hybrid genre of multiple voices, stories, poems, images, proverbs, theory, and personal or familiar experience. She examines the everyday practices of third world women, such as storytelling, and finds in them metaphors and ways of working which inform her own engagement with writing and institutional concerns. Both Barthes and Trihn write "very close to the other," undoing the "I" while asking "What do I want wanting to *know* you or me?" (76).

For Trihn, "To write is to become," a particularly crucial point for feminism which opens onto broader grammatological concerns: "having always traced its own limits while going beyond the limits of its assigned role as expression or communication, it [writing] may be viewed as that which does not translate a reality outside itself but, more precisely, allows the emergence of a new reality" (18, 21-2). In other words, writing is transformative: "So where do you go from here? where do I go? and where does a committed woman writer go? Finding a voice, searching for words and sentences: say some thing, one thing, or no thing; tie/untie, read/unread, discard their forms; scrutinize the grammatical habits of your writing and decide for yourself whether they free or repress. Again, order(s). Shake syntax, smash the myths, and if you lose, slide on, unearth some new linguistic paths. Do you surprise? Do you shock? Do you have a choice? (20). [*That's so true! I recognize that scene of language!*"] Trihn's responses to these questions include work in an electronic medium of writing. Her film, Surname Viet Given Name Nam, is an embodied way of working as Trihn writes, using informal memory, with the gestures, actions, rituals, and daily practices of Vietnamese women. As a Vietnamese woman, she reveals how her own subjectivity is socially inscribed through performance rather than critique, producing knowledge through *movement*, rather than place. She maps information performatively, through images and sounds based on the rhythms and cadences of women's gestures, voices, and narrative styles, rather than competently or masterfully tracing facts about these practices. Trihn's process of writing, as embodiment, performance, and becoming, maps potential, not simply facts. Thus Trihn demonstrates how the poetics of literature can be taken out of the confines of schooling and used for the politics of living, and the poetics of everyday life can be used to transform the politics of the institution. "Writing the body" is a dramatic method, "a way of making theory in gender, of making theory a politics of everyday life" (44).

V.

To begin, of course, in the middle of things: a becoming, like Deleuze and Guattari's wrestlers, executed in a timing of suspension between the excitement of anticipation and the surprise of "what happened?" Barthes, too, has written of a hesitation *that moves*, a writing in the "middle of life" which provokes, through the work of Proust, an "indecision of genres" and a "transformation of the landscape." The analogy stands out like a hitchhiker's thumb.... "In the middle," writes Deleuze, "everything picks up speed."

As Derrida has suggested, the "end of the book" is a refusal of the notion that the signified, as totality, pre-exists the signifier. Thus grammatological writing, no longer defined as the representation of speech nor the communication of a message, offers a way to "write beyond" the ethnocentrism implicit in phonetic script, the metaphysics of being as self-presence, and the linearization of unfolding presence. Derrida counters the subject/object split of alphabetic literacy with "an attempt to recapture the unity of gesture and speech, of body and language, of tool and thought, before the originality of one to the other is articulated" (*Of Grammatology*, 86). This conflation of subject and object recalls Plato's criticism of identificatory pedagogy. He considered "doxa" and mimesis as "in between," not knowledge and not ignorance; the "is plus the is not" which, antithetical to principles of consistency, embraced wandering and contradiction (Havelock, 247). For Plato, the "endless doings" and "becomings" of poetry threatened philosophy's need for the "is" or presence of "being." While Derrida counters linear writing with the multiple registers of the hieroglyph, *A Thousand Plateaus* suggests an alternative to the "tree" book of philosophy through the poetics of the rhizome: "What is at question in the rhizome is a relation to sexuality-- but also to the animal, the vegetal, the world, politics, the book, things natural and artificial-- that is totally different from the arborescent relation: all manner of "becomings" (21). One possible project for grammatology, in Deleuze and Guattari's terms, is to build "abstract machines" for writing. These machines will generate "becomings," "rhizomatic lines of flight" which de- and reterritorialize into new assemblages along continuums of constant variation. In other words, *A Thousand Plateaus* offers the rhizomatic alternative to the tree-book through "transformational research": writing- as- becoming.

1.) Tree-tracing and rhizomatic mapping

"A succession of catatonic freezes and extreme velocities, fainting spells and shooting arrows. Sleep on your steed, then take off at a gallop. Jump from one assemblage to another, with the aid of a faint, by crossing a void" (268).

For Deleuze and Guattari, the tree is the structural image which has dominated Western thought with its hierarchical branchings, centrality, and fundamental rootedness. The "root-book," which produces signification through subjective interiority and reproduces the world according to the traditional teleology of imitation, is thus capable

only of *reflecting* the world through a binary logic. Subjugating sexuality to climax and reproduction, the tree-book cannot assemble in heterogeneity with an outside; it is "necessarily a tracing: already a tracing of itself, a tracing of the previous book by the same author, a tracing of other books however different they may be, an endless tracing of established concepts and words" (24). To show the limitations of signification and subjectification created by the tracing of the tree model, Deleuze and Guattari cite the work of Rosenstiehl and Petitot on the imagery of "command trees" in computing: "The arborescent form admits of topological explanation. . . . In a hierarchical system, an individual has only one active neighbor, his or her hierarchical superior. . . . The channels of transmission are pre-established: the arborescent system preexists the individual, who is integrated into it in an allotted place" (16). Contrary to the centralized "tracing" of tree logic, D&G call for acentered, rhizomatic systems of "mapping" in which the "transduction of intensive states replaces topology" (17). In the "logic" of the rhizome, "communication runs from any neighbor to any other, the stems or channels do not preexist, and all individuals are interchangeable, defined only by their state at a given moment" (17). While "the tree is filiation, the rhizome is alliance, uniquely alliance. The tree imposes the verb 'to be,' but the fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction 'and . . . and . . . and . . .'" (25). For D&G, "the middle is by no means an average; on the contrary, it is where things pick up speed. *Between* things does not designate a localizable relation going from one thing to the other and back again, but a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that sweeps one *and* the other away, a stream without beginning or end that undermines its banks and picks up speed in the middle" (25). "Always in the middle, between things," a rhizome is made of plateaus or "self vibrating" regions of intensities "whose development avoids any orientation toward a culmination point or external end" (25, 22). The map, as part of the rhizome, "is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual group, or social formation. It can be drawn on a wall, constructed as a political action, or as a meditation" (12). The map's multiple entryways and exits reject pre-traced destiny, while the tracing always comes back "to the same." In contrast to the tree logic of tracing and reproduction which always involves "competence," the rhizome is a "mapping" oriented toward experimentation and performance (12).

2.) Abstract machines produce assemblages: order-words and pass-words.

"From what moment can it be said that someone is bald?" (86).

While Derrida calls for an exteriorization of memory, Deleuze and Guattari's theory of schizoanalysis also suggests a system for thinking "out of our heads." Criticizing all hermeneutic endeavors from linguistics to psychoanalysis, D&G assert: "for both statements and desires, the issue is never to reduce the unconscious or interpret it or to make it signify according to a tree model. The issue is to produce the unconscious and with it new statements and new desires: the rhizome is precisely this production of the unconscious" (18). According to D&G, "I" is an "order word" which extracts from the multitude of discourses something called the "self." For the schizophrenic cogito,

self-consciousness is the result of the incorporeal transformations of the "order word" in an "assemblage." For example, the threat of a hijacker with a revolver is an action, as is the execution of hostages. But the transformation of the passengers into hostages and the plane into a prison-body is an instantaneous incorporeal transformation; the "order-words" of a given society designate this relation between statements and the incorporeal transformations or noncorporeal attributes they express (81). Thus, on the one hand, D&G's "transformational research" investigates the relations between social bodies, order word variations, and incorporeal transformations. But in addition, transformational research shows how to generate the very condition of this possibility through the creation of "abstract machines." For D&G, Lenin's use of slogans constituted an "abstract machine" which produced an incorporeal transformation by extracting, from the masses, a proletarian class before the conditions were present for the proletariat to exist as a body. In other words, the slogans uttered by Lenin produced an abstract machine which invented an "assemblage" called the Bolsheviks: "the abstract machine does not function to represent, even something real, but rather constructs a real that is yet to come, a new type of reality" (142). It is important to keep in mind that order-words are both judgements and messages to flee. The danger of order-words, as D&G point out, is that they have the power to invoke a death sentence, not only in terms of eradicating previous order-words, but also the power, quite literally, of execution. The question then becomes how to use the order-word's multiple senses of execution, to heed its message of warning, and "transform the compositions of order into components of passage" (110). The passwords, which move both above and below delegated assignments, operate like puns in language, producing other alliances which provide thresholds between assemblages.

Traditional research in the humanities involves bringing together texts which are organized according to prior structures of understanding. Consequently, the writer or researcher already knows what he or she will produce, and the difficulty of an assignment is producing a persuasive argument for a hypothesis known in advance of the writing. But, corroborating grammatological interests, A Thousand Plateaus asserts that one may write not knowing the answer. In other words, the process of writing becomes a way to "invent" the future. Thus A Thousand Plateaus offers useful suggestions for non-linear compositional practices capable of transformational research: "Schizoanalysis, or pragmatics, has no other meaning: Make a rhizome. But you don't know what you can make a rhizome with, you don't know what subterranean stem is effectively going to make a rhizome, or enter a becoming, or people your desert. So experiment" (251).

3.) The abstract machine in assemblages: writing as becoming.

"One does not conform to a model, one straddles the right horse" (286).

Abstract machines not only produce assemblages, but also inhabit them as "planes of composition" and "plateaus of continuous variation," constituting "becomings" which open and transform assemblages. The plane is not a principle of organization but a means of transportation: nothing develops, no subject forms, things form assemblages according to compositions of speed. For Deleuze and Guattari, the ideal for a composition is to lay everything out on a single page, a plane of consistency: lived

events, historical determinations, concepts, individuals, groups, social formations (9). In other words, abstract machines are plateaus of continuous variation which place variables of content (bodies) and expressions (regimes of signs) in continuums of intensity which conjugate and form a rhizome throughout the assemblage. For example, D&G talk about how Black Americans don't oppose Black to English, but transform the "major language" of English, which is their language, into the "minor language" of Black English. In other words, through their idiolect, blacks transform their own language from major to minor; they place the major language into a continuous state of variation. Thus "it is in one's own language that one is bilingual or multilingual. Conquer the major language in order to delineate in it as yet unknown minor languages. Use the minor language to *send the major language racing*" (104-5). Consequently, a minor change in intensity transforms the whole assemblage: "It is certainly not by using a minor language as a dialect, by regionalizing and ghettoizing, that one becomes revolutionary; rather, by using a number of minority elements, by connecting and conjugating them, one invents a specific, unforeseen, autonomous becoming" (106).

"Becoming," like a rhizome, concerns alliance; it is in the domain of symbioses that bring into play beings of totally different scales and kingdoms, with no possible filiation (238). It is the movement whereby the line frees itself from the point, the flight of the rhizome which renders points imperceptible. Becomings, as pure relations of speed and slowness, are below and above the threshold of perception. And because the adequate threshold of perception can operate only as a function of a perceptible form and a perceived, discerned subject, movement continues to occur elsewhere (280-1). In other words, D&G believe that through becoming-other we can escape the binarism of being self or imitating another as origin. Their dictum: Become Imperceptible! means we are constantly forming blocks of alliance with something "other"; there is no subject, no self, only assemblages. As they demonstrate with the example of Alexis the Trotter, "becoming-horse," does not consist of imitation in the traditional secondary sense (305). Instead, as in the case of Little Hans, "becoming-horse" is not an identification, nor an analogy, but an endowment of Han's elements with the relations of movement and rest, the affects, that make him become horse, and offer a creative way out of the blockages or prohibitions of subjectivity (257-8).

Like Signsponge, A Thousand Plateaus emphasizes the necessity of showing this process of writing-as-becoming through showing the ongoing thought-work of mapping. There is an aborescence of the rhizome that occurs when scattered holes along the rhizome begin to resonate together, when continuums of intensity begin to conjugate, making it possible to trace coordinating vectors and superimpositions. Yet tracings, which can only mark blockages or impasses, should always be put back on the map, since the rhizomes are always leaving the trees as flows escaping, inventing connections that jump from tree to tree and uproot them (506). Thus minor languages develop in major languages, but then go on to transform them. At this point, it may be important to note that for D&G, "style" is "nothing other than the procedure of a continuous variation" (97). They cite Godard as an example of an author who has "his own mad production of speeds and intervals" (98). Consequently, D&G's statement that "there is no difference between what a book talks about and how it is made," is easier to understand in the context of Godard's films, which often place what is usually categorized as content on the level of form (4). Like Godard's filmmaking, writing, as a kind of becoming through

mapping, marks the thresholds through which an idea passes, the journey it takes that changes its nature or object (235). If, as Derrida has posited, grammatology is more concerned with style than logic, Deleuze and Guattari's claims for writing-as-becoming suggest that transformational research will replace interpretation.

A Briefers and Afterthought

I am interested in making more specific connections between Trihn's idea of embodiment and Deleuze and Guattari's concept of "bodies without organs" in order to formulate the potential of "writing as becoming" as a way of working which conflates theory, gender, daily life and politics. Trihn's constellation of feminism, embodiment, and performative writing as "becoming" should be mapped onto Deleuze and Guattari's rhizome, mapping, performance, and "becoming-other."

The "exteriorization of memory" in grammatology takes memory out of the context of intentional consciousness, and yet also uses the body as mnemonic system. As Benjamin notes in his work on Proust, "involuntary memory," memory which is triggered by smells, objects, tastes, or gestures is characterized by "a kind of forgetting." For Deleuze and Guattari, "becoming-other" is also associated with "anti-memory," "blocks of forgetting," and "bodies without organs." They associate long term memory with what has become "natural" to our systems of thinking, such as linear chronology and cause/effect logic. Thus they value short term memory or "forgetting," which connects things momentarily and without "literate" causality or chronology. Only through "forgetting," the historical connections which reinforce the system of logocentric codes already inscribed in our bodies, can blocks of knowledge become exteriorized from intention and presence. Thus the concept "bodies without organs" does not mean a negation or repression of the organic body, but it does require leaving behind an outdated explanatory system. In fact, this is a liberation of the organic body from the accumulated cultural impositions and social restraints which have been placed on it through the remembrance of history. We can only think through our bodies, but we don't have to explain through them. the encoding of memory oin unintentional body knowledge.= a kind of forgetting and using that knowledge as metaphors to reinvent = bodies without organs. Connect Trihn's embodoed writing to bodieswout organs and machinic or abstract mmachines of writibg.